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OFFER OF GUARANTY, ITS ACCEPTANCE, AND
NOTICE THEREOF
Every agreement, whether written or oral, is the result
of, and springs from, an offer and the acceptance thereof.
What must be done by an offeree to constitute acceptance
of an offer, depends, of course, upon the terms of the offer,
which must be accepted in the manner prescribed, expressly
or impliedly, by the offer. Usually, the queston of the necessity of notice of acceptance is not difficult of solution. In
the case of a bilateral contract, the offer of a promise is accepted by the making of another promise by the offeree, and
in such a case, it is essential that he communicate to the offeror the promise of acceptance.' In a unilateral contract,
an offer of a promise is accepted by some act or forbearance on the part of the offeree. Whether notice of acceptance, i.e., that the act has been done, must be given to the offeror, depends upon the express or implied terms of the offer.2 Notice of acceptance of the offer in a unilateral contract is not essential unless the offer expressly or impliedly
stipulates therefor.
But in case of an offer of guaranty, the American courts
have held that the guarantor, the offeror, will not be bound
113 C. J.

284.

C. J.

284.

213

DICKINSON LAW

REVIEW

simply by the doing of the act called for as acceptance, but
that the offeree, the creditor, must also give notice of his
acceptance to the guarantor.3 This rule is purely of Amer-ican origin. No notice was necessary under the English
common law. The rule can be traced to a dictum by Chief
Justice Marshall in Russell v. Clark,4 when he said, "Had it
been such a contract (of guaranty) it would certainly have
been the duty of the plaintiff to give immediate notice to
the defendant of the extent of their engagements." This
was followed by another dictum by the same judge, 5 and
the question was first presented to the court for decision in
Douglass v. Reynolds,6 in which Mr. Justice Story said, "A
party giving a letter of guaranty has a right to know whether
it is accepted and whether the person to whom it is addressed means to give credit upon the footing of it or not."
The true reason and foundation for the rule are uncertain. In some instances it has been treated as a rule inhering in the very nature of every contract; 7 in others, as a rule
springing from the peculiar nature of the contract of guaranty.8
Although many courts announce the rule that there
must be notice of the acceptance of an offer of guaranty, the
application of the rule is involved in considerable uncertainty and difficulty. But it is believed that the cases in which
notice of acceptance is, or is not, necessary may be conveniently classified.

-For exhaustive discussion of this question and collection of
cases, see 16 L. R. A. (n. s.) 353; 33 L. R. A. (n. s.) 960; 5 C.

7.. R. 215; 2 C. L.

Q.

329.

47 Cranch (U. S.) 69.
5Edmonston v.

Drake, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 624.

67 Pet. (U. S.) 113.
7Davis v.
Pa. 460.
8Bishop v.

Wells,

104 U.

S.

159, 164; Kellogg

Eaton, 161 Mass. 496.

v.

Stockton, 29
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Usually the question of the necessity of notice of acceptance of an offer of guaranty arises where the prospective guarantor offers the creditor that he will guarantee payment if the creditor will make advances or loans to, extend
credit to, or sell goods to the debtor. In England,9 and some
American jurisdictions 0 there is no difficulty, as the courts
hold that the creditor accepts the guarantor's offer simply
by doing the act, extending credit in some form to the debtor, and that notice of his acceptance to the guarantor is not
necessary. In at least one court it is said that the guarantor's offer is accepted by the creditor doing the act called
for, and that notice of acceptance is a condition subsequent,
the non-performance of which within a reasonable time will
discharge the guarantor. 1
The majority of American courts, however, follow the
rule of the federal courts, that acceptance of an offer of
guaranty is not complete until notice of acceptance is given. 12 Various reasons have been given to sustain the
soundness of the rule. It has been said that notice of acceptance is essential to a meeting of the minds of the parties
9Pope v. Andrews, 9 Car. & P. 564; Morrell v. Cowan, 7 Ch.
D. 151; Oxley v. Young, 2 H. Bl. 613.
lODouglass v. Howland, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 35, where it was
well said, "The rule as to notice in contracts of guaranty was unknown to the common law, yet It is sought to engraft it on our
jurisprudence as a common law doctrine, to attach conditions to
the contract of guaranty, which are not applied to other contracts.
When a proposition of guaranty of one party is accepted by the
other, this makes a complete contract." See also City Bank v.
Phelps, 86 N. Y. 484; Boyd v. Snider, 49 Md. 325; Wise v. Miller,
45 Oh. 388; London, etc., Bank v. Parrott, 125 Cal. 472.
"1 Bishop v. Eaton, 161 Mass. 496; Lenox v. Murphy, 171 Mass.
370; Cumberland Mfg. Co. v. Wheaton, 208 Mass. 425.
' 2 See collection of cases in Childs on Suretyship and Guaranty,
p. 26; 28 C. J. 900, et seq; Davis Co. v. Richards, 115 U. S. 524;
Davis v. Wells, 104 U. S. 159; Taylor v. Empire Co., 273 Fed.
739; Acme Mfg. Co. v. Reed, 197 Pa. 359; Evans v. McCormick,
167 Pa. 247; Coe v. Buehler, 110 Pa. 366; Kay v. Allen, 9 Pa. 320;
Kellogg v. Stockton, 29 Pa. 460.
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and an inception of the contract. 13 The guarantor is also
entitled to notice in order that, being secondarily liable, he
may know the extent of his liability

4

and have an opportun-

ity of taking indemnity from his principal or of otherwise
securing himself against loss,"5 and have a reasonable
time in which to arrange for the necessary funds to pay the
amount of his guaranty, if the principal defaults, and to
avail himself of the appropriate means in law and equity to
compel the other parties to discharge him from future re.sponsibility.' 6 The writer of a general letter of credit is entitled to be notified by the person accepting or acting upon
the letter, in order that he may know to whom and to what
extent he is under obligation.' 7
Bearing in mind the foregoing reasons why notice of
acceptance of an offer of guaranty is necessary, perhaps the
most convenient way to examine the subject is to determine
in what cases such notice is unnecessary and then to arrive
at some statement as to those cases which require notice of
acceptance.
In the first place, it is generally conceded that if the
contract of guaranty is bilateral, i.e., there is an offer of a
promise to guarantee in return for a promise on the part of
the creditor to the guarantor that he will extend credit to the
debtor, the mutual promises and their communication constitute offer and acceptance and no further notice is necessary.'8 But it is submitted that the same reasons which
require notice of acceptance in any case apply as well to
bilateral contracts, so that the guarantor may know when the
"3Kellogg v. Stocktox, 29 Pa. 460.
This reason, It seems,
would require notice of acceptance In any unilateral contract.
14Acme Mfg. Co. v. Reed, 197 Pa. 359.

25 Supra, note 14.
3eSupra, note 14.
27Kay v. Allen, 9 Pa. 320.
lsDavls v. Wells, 104 U. S. 159; Cooke v.
20 H. L. R. 485.

Orne, 37 Ill. 186;
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creditor has actually acted on the guaranty and may know
to what extent he is bound to the creditor. 19
Again, notice of acceptance is unnecessary, where the
contract recites the receipt by the guarantor of a distinct and
valuable consideration, 20 moving to him from the creditor,
whether paid or not;21 or, where there is proof of payment
of a distinct and valuable consideration by the creditor to
the guarantor, this constitutes an acceptance by the creditor,
and no further notice of acceptance

is necessary,2

unless

specially stipulated for by the guarantor. Even in such
cases, it is submitted, the reason that the guarantor is entitled to knowledge of the extent of his liability should require notice of acceptance as much as in any other case.
Since a promise by a guarantor to pay an existing debt
of his principal must be supported by a new and distinct
consideration,23moving from the creditor, such a case is
paragraph,
brought plainly within the rule -of the preceding
4
and notice of acceptance is unnecessary.2
In the third place, it is agreed that where the offer of
guaranty and the acceptance are concurrent or contemporaneous, i.e., the offer is made at the same time that the creditor enters into the guaranteed contract with the principal,
no further notice of acceptance is necessary. 25 Such a conlOSupra, note 14.
Lenning, 161 Pa. 171; Davis Co. v. Richards,
115 U. S. 524; Davis v. Wells, 104 U. S. 159.
2ITaylor v. Tolman, 47 Ill. App. 264.
22Koenigsberg v. Lenning, 161 Pa. 171, where guarantor promised to guarantee the principal's future debts if the creditor would
discharge an existing lien on the principal's property.
23By new and distinct consideration is meant a consideration
other than that which supports the principal's obligation to the
creditor.
24Kent v. Silver, 108 Fed. 365; Shupe v. Galbraith, 32 Pa. 19.
25
Siegel v. Bailey, 252 Pa. 231; Kay v. Allen, 9 Pa. 320; Davis
Co. v. Richards, 115 U. S. 524.
SoKoenigsberg v.
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clusion is self-explanatory, since the guarantor already has

knowledge of the terms of the guaranteed transaction.
Next, it is said that where the offer is in the form of an
absolute guaranty, definitely fixing the terms, or in the form
of a suretyship, notice of acceptance is not necessary,26 as
the offeror already knows the extent of his liability and the
contingencies upon which it will arise. Similarly, notice
has been held unnecessary where the offer is to guarantee
future advances to the principal up to a fixed amount. This
latter rule, however, has not been followed in Pennsylvania,
on the ground, that without notice, the guarantor does not
know the extent of his liability27

Lastly, most courts are in accord that where the request or offer comes from the creditor, the promise of the
guarantor is then itself an acceptance of an offer, and the
guaranty is complete as soon as the promise of guaranty is
given, and the creditor need give no further notice that he
has acted upon it. 28 It is argued that the creditor, by requesting the guaranty, has given his notice of its acceptance in advance, and the guarantor, when he gives the
guaranty knows that it will be accepted.
To this proposition the courts of Pennsylvania have
never acceded, and they have uniformly and consistently
held that the fact that the request or offer comes from the
creditor does not preclude the necessity of his notice to the

26U. S. Fidelity Co. v. Riefler, 239 U. S. 17; Acme Mfg. Co.
v. Reed, 197 Pa. 359; Columbia Baking Co. v. Schissler, 35 Pa.
Super. 621; Hartley Silk Co. v. Berg, 48 Pa. Super. 419; for distinction between absolute and conditional guaranty, see Iron City
National Bank v. Rafferty, 207 Pa. 238; Hartley Silk Co. v. Berg,
48 Pa. Super. 419; Riddle v. Thompson, 104 Pa. 330.
27Davis Co. v. Richards, 115 U. S. 524; Acme M~fg. Co. v.
Reed, 197 Pa. 359.
2SDavis Co. v.
U.

Richards, 115 U.

S. 159; and cases cited in 28 C. J.

S.

524; Davis v.

906, note 5.

Wells, 104

DICKINSON LAW

REVIEW

guarantor that he has acted on the guaranty.29 As was said
by Bell, J., in Kay v. Allen,3 0 "It is difficult to imagine how
precedent request alone can supply the place of subsequent
notice, since after request made and proffer of guaranty, the
merchant may refuse the credit or advance craved, and without notice the surety cannot know whether he has or not."31
Although it is dangerous to generalize, it is submitted
that the Pennsylvania courts require notice of acceptance of
an offer of guaranty in the following cases: where the guaranty is not absolute, is not bilateral, is not supported by a
new and distinct consideration, is not a guaranty of an existing or contemporaneous obligation of the principal, but
the offer is to guarantee future extensions of credit to the
principal, the making of which will constitute acceptance by
the creditor, such acceptance will not bind the guarantor,
and he is not bound until he has notice within a reasonable
time that the guaranty has been accepted, or, in other words,
that it has been acted upon, and the rule is the same although the offer is to guarantee future credits up to a certain
amount and although the request or offer comes from the
creditor.

32

Under this rule, in the cases in which it is applicable, it
is seen that notice of acceptance is deemed essential to the
inception of the contract, and that until such notice there
is no acceptance binding the guarantor. As stated above,
notice is necessary that the guarantor may know the extent
of his responsibility, and so regulate his course of conduct
that he may not suffer loss. But, it is submitted, the rule

29Evans v.

McCormick, 167 Pa. 247; Columbia Baking Co.

Schissler, 35 Pa. Super.

621; Haslin Mills v.

v.

Berg, 19 Pa. Dist.

546.
309 Pa. 320.

31Followed in Gardner v. Lloyd, 110 Pa. 278.
32See Penna. cases cited in notes, supra, and especially Acme
Mfg. Co. v. Reed, 197 Pa. 359; Evans v. McCormick, 167 Pa. 247.
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may work hardship on the creditor .33 As the offer of guaranty is a mere offer, it may be withdrawn at any time before
notice of acceptance. A creditor could never be sure after
advancing the goods or money on the credit of the offer of
guaranty, that his notice of acceptance would reach the
guarantor before the latter had an opportunity of withdraw34
ing his offer.
S3See 2 Cornell L. Q. 329.
34For form, sufficiency, time, and waiver of such notice, see
20 C. J.

907-909; Childs on Suretyship and Guaranty, pp. 32-33.
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MOOT COURT
STROHMAN'S ESTATE
Evidence-Party Deed-Decedent's Estates---Competency-Act of May
23, 1887, P. L. 158
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In distributing Strohman's estate in the Orphans' Court, two
persons, Parsons and Mulford, claimed as creditors. Parsons testified to matters after Strohman's death, and was cross-examined
by counsel for the estate with respect to matters that were anterior to his death as well as matters posterior. He then offered himMulford
self to testify to matters anterior to death In his favor.
testified to pre and post mortem facts without objection, , and was
cross-examined as to both claims of facts. He then claimed this
cross-examination made him generally competent.
Walker for the Plaintiff.
Strait for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
W. G. MILLER, J. The ultimate decision to be made by the
court Is whether or not Mulford's contention is a good one. To
decide this several other questions must first be answered.
First, regarding Parsons, it is without question that he could
testify to matters after Strohman's death without objection, for such
testimony would be directed against living persons, namely Strohman's administrator or executor as the case may be, As to matters before Strohman's death, he could not testify, for where death
has closed the mouth of one party to a thing or contract in action
the law will preserve equality by excluding the living party thereto from testifying regarding such matters. Act of May 23, 1887,
5 P. L. 158. But there are exceptions to this rule.
.After Parsons testified to matters after Strohman's death
lie was cross-examined by counsel for the estate with respect to
matters that were anterior to his death as well as posterior. As
stated before there can be no question about Parson's competency
in testifying to matters posterior, but here the Estate's counsel tears
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down the shield given him by the above mentioned Act and cross-examined Parsons regarding matters anterior to the decedent's death.
The Common Law rule is that if a party puts an Incompetent witness on the stand, he makes him fully competent for the other
party.
Shadle's Estate, No. 1, 30 Pa. Superior 151; Yeager's Estate, 31 Pa. Superior 202; Turner v. Waterson, 4 W. & S. 171; Stockton v. Demuth, 7 Watts 39.
Now Parsons offered himself to testify to matters anterior to
Strohman's death in his favor.
By the decision we find that under
the above stated facts, an exception Is made to the Act of May 23,
1887, and Parsons becomes competent to testify to matters in his
own favor which occured before the decedent's death. Watkins v.
Hughes, 206 Pa. 526; Corson's Estate, 137 Pa. 160; Boyd v. Conshohocken Worsted Mills, 149 Pa. 363; Hambleton's Estate 166 Pa.
500; Cladd's Estate, 214 Pa. 141.
Let us now consider Mulford, who without objection testified
to matters both pre- and post-mortem, and was then cross-examined as the both classes of facts. Mulford's position Is different from
that of Parson's.
He testified to pre-mortem affairs without objection before he was cross-examined by the estate's counsel of such
affairs. Patterson v. Wallace, 44 Pa. 88 held that an objection to
a witness called by one party, if known to the opposite party must
be made before he is examined. If he Is permitted to testify without objection his competency cannot afterward be objected to when
recalled for examination at any subsequent stage of the trial.
Substantially the same was held In Dean v. Warnock 98 Pa. 665.
These facts fit Mulford's position in this case. After testifying to
pre-mortem affairs without objection he became generally competent.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Unfortunately, the facts upon which this
given by the learned court below.

case

turns are

not

Parsons testified, as creditor of the deceased, In support of his
claim, to matters subsequent to the death of Strohman.
Clause e
of the Act of 1887 did not make him Incompetent.
But he was
made Incompetent to testify to ante-mortem facts. He was crossexamined for the estate, as to such ante-mortem facts. This was a
tacit avowal of his trustworthiness In respect to the matters as to
which he was examined.
But, if so trustworthy, he is sufficiently
so to be allowed to testify to other ante-mortem facts. He becomes
a fully competent witness.
Act of 1887, Paragraph 6.
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Mulford testified to matters as to which he would have been inHe was cross-examincompetent, had objection to him been made.
This qualified him to testify as
ed concerning ante-mortem facts.
to any such fact. The judgment of the learned court below is
AFFIRMED.
TONER v. THE CAR COMPANY
Contract-Sale--ecisson-Demand-Objection

in

Good Faith

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Toner bought an auto truck from the defendant for $1800.00.
It was agreed that if it was not satisfactory to Toner, he could return It and the purchase money should be refunded. After trial,
Toner was dissatisfied with the truck and returned it, demanding
the money from the defendant who refused to receive the truck
or pay the money. The Court told the jury that there must be
some reasonable objection to produce the dissatisfaction. Otherwise the defendant is not bound to repay the money. Verdict for
defendant.

Motion for new trial.

Ingham, for the Plaintiff.
Kline, for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
this case is
The question to be decided in
IREIDER, J.
whether the purchaser of an article sold, under an agreement that
it may be returned If not satisfactory, has the right to return it if
his objections are made merely in good faith and not capriciously or
whether the purchaser must go further and convince the Court and
Jury that his objections are also reasonable.
Counsel for the plaintiff contends that in cases of this kind the
paramount issue to be decided is the good faith in which the objection is made, and not the reasonableness of the motives which produced the objection.
Counsel for the defendant, on the other hand, rests his case
wholly upon the proposition that the plaintiff has acted capriciously
and not In good faith because "he has shown no definite grounds
for his dissatisfaction" and therefore ought not to recover the purchase price. This position, however, is based upon an assumption
We are not told
which is not warranted by the facts in the case.
whether the plaintiff "showed definite grounds for his dissatisfaction" or not and therefore, as any further consideration of the defendant's position would have to be based on mere speculation, we
will pass it by and turn to the principal point in the case viz: Was
the Court's instruction to the jury correct when it charged that
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"there must be some reasonable objection
faction."

,to produce

the dissatis-

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in an unbroken line . of
cases has laid down the rule that the purchaser of an article sold,
under an agreement that it could be returned if not satisfactory,
has the right to return it if his objections are made in good faith
and not capriciously, even though these objeotions are not reasonable in the opinion of the Court and the jury. Singerly v. Thayer,
108 Pa. 291, Krum v. Mersher, 116 Pa. 17, Seeley v. Welles, 120
Pa. 69, Sidney School Furniture Co. v. Warsaw School District, 130
Pa. 76, Howard v. Smedley, 140 Pa. 81, Adams Radiator Works
Co. v. Schnader, 155 Pa. 394, McNally v. Jenkinson, 35 Pa. Superfor 288, Thaler Bros. v. Greisser Co., 229 Pa. 512; Williams v. Notopolls, 259 Pa. 469, Rand v. Mitchell Car Co., 263 Pa. 425.
In Singerly v. Thayer, 108 Pa. 291, B installed an elevator
"warranted in every respect" In A's building.
After two months'
use, A alleged it was unsatisfactory. B sues for the contract price.
Held: While it could not be rejected for mere caprice, yet a bona
fide objection by him to its working was a sufficient defence to the
action.
The court in a much quoted opinion said: "He did not
agree to accept what might be satisfactory to others but what was
satisfactory to himself. This was a fact which the contract gave
him the right to decide. He was the person who was to test it and
to use it.
No other person could intelligently determine whether
in every respect he was satisfied with it."
In Thaler Bros. v. Greisser Co., 229 Pa. 512, Mr. Justice Von
Moschzisker said: "Where the work or material is to be satisfactory
to the party acquiring it the question for determination Is not as to
whether or not the one complaining ought to be satisfied but solely
as to the good faith of the dissatisfaction alleged.
Finally in
Rand v.
Mitchell Car Co., 263 Pa. 428, we find
the facts almost identical with the case at bar.
Rt purchased an
auto from the M Company. It was agreed that if he was not satisfled he could return the car and have his money refunded. After
three months' use R sought to return the car but the company refused to take it back or refund the purchase price.
In his suit for
the purchase price the trial judge instruoted the jury that the
plaintiff must have "some reasonable objection that would make
him dissatisfied with it." On appeal the Supreme Court held that
"such objections need only be made in good faith, and not merely
capriciously In order to justify the returning of an article because it
violates a contract that it shall be satisfactory."
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After an examination of the cases cited above we are convinced
that the trial judge In the case at bar erred in his instruction to the
jury and therefore the motion for -a new trial is granted.

OPINION OF THE SUPDEME COURT
If the automobile was "not satisfactory to Toner," he was to return it, and recover the money paid. The Car. Co. chose to enter
The effect was to be "satisfaction," and, In
into such a contract.
Toner's mind, not in that of a jury. The causes of dissaisfaation
are unimportant.
Perhaps, they would not seem adequate, to one
But, Toner had a right to be peculiar, even
man in 100, or 1000.

foolish and unreasonable.
In some of the cases, the expression has crept in, that the
objection need only to be made in good faith, and not merely capriciously. Rand v. Car .Co., 263 Pa. 425; but apparently all that
this can mean Is, that there shall not merely be a statement of dissatisfaction, but an actual dissatisfaction. An actual dissatisfaction
cannot well be affected with bad faith; though it might well be stupid, absurd, unreasonable. If a vendor is unwilling to make his
contract's conclusiveness on the vendee depend on the reasonableness of his objections, he should refuse to concede the right to return
the thing, on being dissatisfied. There is a sense, well recognized,
in which the capriciousness of. the purchaser Is no bar to his rescission of the contract, and precisely what the word is used to express, remains for further explication, in the cases.
The well written opinion of the learned court below sustains
amply its conclusion, and the judgment Is
AFFIRMED.

SHIPLEY v. RICHAIDS
Decedent's Estates-Collateral Inheritance Tax-Liability of Purchaser for Tax-Sale--Contract--Construction-Act of June 20,
1919, P. L.
Mask for the Plaintiff.
O'Connor for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
NEWMAN, J.: This Is an action of assumpsit to recover onehalf of an inheritance tax paid by the plaintiff upon the estate of
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X, which plaintiff and defendant jointly inherited.
The plaintiff
purchased the defendant's interest in the estate for $25,000.
Subsequent to the purchase, the state collected an inheritance tax of
$2,500 from the purchaser. The contract of sale contained the
phrases, "without deduction for any consideration" and "title to be
in fee, good and marketable."
Two questions are presented for consideration under these facts.
(1) Is an Inheritance. tax levied upon the estate of the decedent or
upon the Interest of the collateral heirs? (2) What construction is
to be placed upon the phrases, "without any deduction for any consideration," and "Title to be in fee, good and marketable."
The tax upon collateral inheritance is levied under the Act of
June 20, 1919, (P. L. 521), repealing the Act of May 6, 1887,
(P. L. 79).
The Act provides, "all taxes imposed by this Act, shall
be ...... at the rate of 5 per cent upon the clear value of the property subject to such tax, passing to or for the use of any other person, persons, bodies, corporate or politic; to be paid for the use of
the Commonwealth."
It is clear, we think, that the phrase, "clear
value," means the value of the estate of the decedent at the time of
the decease, less the debts and obligations of the decedent.
The tax
becomes a lien upon the net estate so remaining and must be discharged by payment before the passage of the estate to the collateral heirs.
They take only what remains after the tax has been deducted.
Our Supreme Court has held: "The collateral inheritance
tax is not levied upon an inheritance or legacy but upon the estate
of the decedent; what passes to the heir or devisee and to which he
acquires title, is the portion of the estate remaining after the payment and satisfaction of the collateral inheritance tax." Jackson
et al v. Myers, Guardian, 257 Pa. 104.
See also Finnen's Estate,
196 Pa. 72; Strode v. Comm., 52 Pa. 181.
This, we believe, summarily disposes of the contention of counsel for the plaintiff that
the tax must be paid by the heir.
Nor does the proposition that the tax might be avoided by a
sale of the inheritance have any weight. The tax is deducted before the estate passes to the heirs. "The law takes every decedent's
estate into custody and administers it for the benefit of creditors,
legatees, devisees, and heirs, and delivers the residue that remains
after discharging all obligations to the distributees entitled to receive It ........
Now this 5 per cent tax is one of the conditions of
administration."
Strode v. Comm., 52 Pa. 181.
Flnnen's Est.,
196 Pa. 72.
This well settled principle of our law that the tax is deducted
before the estate passes is recognized by the Federal courts, which
have held that the federal inheritance tax can be levied only upon
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the net value of the estate, excluding the Pennsylvania inheritance
tax. Northern Trust Co. v. Lederer, 257 Fed. 816.
In the light of the above, the contract of sale must be construed as including only the interest of the defendant in X's estate,
which he would receive after the deduction of the tax. To construe
the contract otherwise would be in direct conflict with the settled interpretation of the law.
The phrase "Without any deduction for any consideration"
must be interpreted as excluding the collateral inheritance tax. The
plaintiff must be assumed to know the law which provides that the
value of the net estate, excludes the tax. Under a similar contract
in Jackson et a, v. Myers, Guardian, supra, Mr. Justice Mestrezat
held, that the stipulated price was to be paid without any deduction
for the collateral inheritance tax, on the ground that where the
terms of a contract are ambiguous, it will be construed in the light
of the existing law.
As to the phrase, "Title to be in fee, good and marketable,"
there is nothing to show that there are any other incumbrances,
than the lien of the state for the collateral inheritance tax. This
encumbrance, the plaintiff is assumed to have recognized and cannot be held to constitute a flaw in the title.
We therefore direct the entry of a compulsory non-suit.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The sale to Shipley was of Richard's "interest in the estate" of
What is his interest? Not the estate in existence at X's death,
X.
nor its value, but so much of it as, under the law passed to Richards. As a part of it passed to Shipley, another part of it passed
Shipley
in the denomination of an inheritance tax, to the State.
did not buy his own share, nor the State's share.
After he became owner of his own share and that of Richards.
The State has compelled
there remained the share of the State.
We see no hypothesis on which he is entitled
him to pay $2,500.
He may have
to recover any portion of this sum from Richards.
misestimated the value of Richard's share, and f~aid too much for it.
But, he agreed to pay what he paid. There was to be no deduction
for any consideration; inter alia, for the fact that the inheritance
The title
tax might be payable by him on account of his purchase.
of Richards to that which he undertook to sell was in fee, good and
Cases referred to by the learned court below justify
marketable.
its conclusion.
The judgment is AFFIRMED.
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HEIIP'S ESTATE

Decedent's Estates-Husband and Wfe--Desertion and Non-support-Forfeiture of Interest in Wife's Estate by Husband-Intestate Act of 1917, Sect. 5, P. L. 429
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mrs. Kemp died owning a house and lot in fee. Her husband
brings ejectment against her brothers, who, as next of kin are In possession. They defend alleging that her husband neglected to furnish
any support for the period of four years prior to her death. The
brothers testified, as did the husband. The Court finding the brothers' testimony true, and the jury likewise, a verdict and judgment were entered for the Defendants.
J. Smith for the Plaintiff.
Sporkin for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SIDDALL, J. This is an action of ejectment by the surviving
husband to recover possession of certain real estate of which his
wife died seized. The defendants who are the brothers as next of
kin are in possession.
The question in this case crystalizes in one sentence. May a
husband who has neglected to support his wife for a period of four
years prior to her death bring an action of ejectment against the
brothers as next of kin of the wife, who are in possession of the
house and lot of which the wife died seized?
To answer this question we must turn to the Intestate Act of
1917, and authorities interpeting, the section reads as follows. "No
husband who shall have for one year or upwards previous to the
death of his wife, willfully neglected or refused to provide for his
wife, or shall have for that period or upwards willfully and maliciously deserted her, shall have the right to claim any title or interest
in her real estate after her decease, under the provisions of this
-act."
Where the facts show a desertion, it is presumed to be wilful and
malicious, and the burden is on the husband to show reasonable and
lawful cause for It. Bealor vs. Hahm, 117 Pa. 169, Hahm vs. Bealor,
132 Pa. 242.
The burden is on the husband to prove that no desertion or refusal to support existed within the meaning of the act. Flanagan's
Est., 59 Sup. 61.
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In the case at bar neither affection nor sense of duty prompted
the husband to return to his wife for a period of four years, but after her death a desire to secure a part of her estate prompted him
to return if possible, recover his share of the wife's estate. From the
statement of facts the husband's absence constituted a wilful and
malicious desertion within the meaning of the act as cited by predeeding authorities. However, it was a question for the jury to determine whether the husband had willfully and maliciously deserted his wife for one year or upward prior to her death, so as to deny
himself right to participate in his share of the estate of which his
The jury found in favor of the Defendants and we
wife died seized.
see no reason to disturb that finding.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
We must assume that the learned court below has found that
Mr. Kemp has "neglected to furnish any support for the period of
four years prior to her death" to his wife. An unexplained failure
Hahn
to furnish support, is presumed to be wilful and malicious.
v. Bealor, 132 Pa. 242, 256. Such neglect, even for one year, would
have cut off any right of the husband to share in her estate, a fortiori for four years.
We see no need of further discussion of this ease in view of the
Cf. Kvists' Estate, 256 Pa. 30.
opinion of the learned court below.
The judgment is AFFIRMED.

FLICKS' ESTATE
Wills-Devises--Rule Against Perpetuities-Charity-Act of May 9,
1889, P. L. 173-Act of May 23, 1895, P. L. 174
STATEMENT OF FACTS
William Flicks devised a sum of $100,000.00 to "X" in trust to
pay the interest to his son, for life, and on his death to his issue,, on
his reaching 21 years of age; if he should not reach that ge, then to
a sharity. It is sontented that the gift to the charity is void. by the
Rule against Prepetutties.
Zickel for the Plaintiff.
Siegel for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SCHLEUSS, J.
The Rule, as stated in Gray on Prepetuities, Sec.
201, is, that; "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not
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later than 21 years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest".
It is a conceded principal that the future interest must vest within a life or lives in being, and 21 years thereafter. It is not sufficient that it may vest. It must vest within that time, or the gift is
void in its creation. Its validity is to be tested by possible and not actual events. And if the gift Is to a class, and it is void as to any of
them, it is void as to all. Coggins' Appeal, 124 Penna. 10; Smith's
Appeal, 88 Penna. 492; Hillyard vs. Miller, 10 Penna. 326.
In Penrose's Estate, 257 Penn. 231, there was a devise similar to
the one in the present case, but there, in her will, the teetatrix prescribed the condition that the issue of the first donee must die without issue beforc the trust estate vested in the chaetv. In the cas.-e
at bar, the testator has prescribed only that the issue of the first
donee becomes extinct before reaching the age of 21 years. Hence,
presuming the issue to be existent at the time of the making of the
will, it would seem clear that if the issue dies before reaching his
twenty-first birthday, the corpus of the triist estate immediately
vests in the charity. If the issue reaches his twenty-first birthday,
the corpus vests in him. Therefore, in any event the corpus must
vest, within 21 years after a life in being, and the rule would not
apply. Weinbrenner's Estate, 173 Penna. 440.
In Pennsylvania, however, even though elsewhere the devise to
the charity would be void as violative of the rule, the Acts of May
9, 1889 (P. L. 173) and May 23, 1-895 (P. L. 174), have abrogated the
rule against perpetuities in respect to charitable trusts.
Such
trusts vest, notwithstanding "the want of a trustee or by reason of
the objects being indefinite, uncertain or ceasing, or depending upon
the discretion of the last trustee, or being given in perpetuity, etc."
Lenning's Estate, 154 Pa. 209; -Young v.
St. Marks Lutheran
Church, 200 Pa. 332.
In view of the above authorities, we therefore hold that the devise to the charity does not violate the rule against perpetuities,
and render judgment for the respondent charity.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The interest of $100,000 was given by the testator, to his son
for life; on his death to his issue, on his reaching 21 years of age.
The issue Intended, was apparently a son in existence when the will
was written. If this issue should not reach 21 years, the money
was given to a charity. It Is clear that the gift to the charity is to
take effect, if at all, within a life in being, (in, that of testator's
son) and of the grandson, if in existence when the will was written
or within a life in being plus 21 years, if the grandson was not in
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existence when the will was written.
The grandson must be born
'within the life of the son, and he must attain the age of 21 in not
more than 21 years after the son's life; (a life on being).
The rule against perpetuities simply forbids the suspension of
the vesting of an estate longer than a life in being plus 21 years.
It does not seem then, that the rule is violated by the will of the
testator.
There is some conflict in the dicta, if not in the decision, concerning the applicability to gifts to charities of the rule against perpetuities. Cf. Lenning's Estate, 154 Pa. 209; where Penrose, J., expresses the opinion that the act of May 9th, 1889, P. L. 173, "in the
most unequivocal terms declares that a gift to charity shall not fail
because transgressive of the rule against perpetuities."
That its
terms are "unequovical" we cannot concede.
In Penrose s E.state,
257 Pa. 231, it is held that a gift to a charity, not Vesting within
the period of the rule against perpetuities was void. We adopt this
as expressive of the present law of Penna.
It would be very inadvisable to make it possible to shift an estate 100, 150, 200 years in
the future, the shifting not being susceptible of anticipation, and
not being preventible by any living agency. Cf. 12 Forum, p. 155.
We therefore adopt the opinion of the learned court below, and
the appeal is DISMISSED.

HARRIS v. COOPER
Vendor and Vendee-Contract-Recission-Default
Installments-Forfeiture

in

Payment

of

Parsons for the Plaintiff.
Pippa for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COU1RT
PERLSTEIN, J.-This Is an Action of assumpsit brought by the
rpurchaser against the vendor to recover back money paid on a contract for the sale of land. The plaintiff entered into an agreement
with the defendant whereby he agreed to buy from the defendant
and the defendant agreed to sell to the plaintiff, a tract of land.
The price was $800 payable in monthly installments of $20.
It was
stipulated that punctuality In payment was to be of the essence of
the contract.
The failure to pay punctually any installments
should result in forfeiture of all rights to vendor. Vendee paid ten
installments, but none of them punctually.
After the tenth, three
months elapsed without any further tender.
Vendor then found
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another purchaser and made a deed to said second purchaser.
dee now seeks to recover the $200..

Ven-

The questions which arise In the case at bar are: (1) Whether or
not acceptance of the late payments operated as a waiver of the'
right of the vendor to insist upon punctuality as to the remaining
payments; and (2) Whether the vendor under the contract of sale in
the case at bar, must place the vendee In status quo, as a prerequisite to the exercise of his rights under the contract, upon a default by the vendee.
A waiver Is an intentional abandonment of a right and may be
inferred from conduct.
The contract specifically states that, in the
case at bar, time shall be of the essence of the contract.
Did the
acceptance of ten payments, none of them paid punctually, constitute such a waiver? We think not.
Such acceptance
standing
alone is not inconsistent with an intention of insisting on punctuality of performance as to the remaining installments.
The purchaser has no right to rest on such Indulgence shown on a number
of occasions as a ground for claiming it on all occasions.
There
may be circumstances, short of an express promise accompanying
the acceptance of payment out of time, which would warrant the
vendee in assuming that the vendor intended not to require strict
compliance in the future. But we do not think that such is the
case here.
The defendant's allowing the plaintiff to make several
late payments should not and does not abrogate the right of the defendant to insist upon punctuality of payment in the future. The
plaintiff has defaulted.
Should the .plaintiff now be allowed to take
advantage of his own default?
Counsel for the plaintiff contends that before the defendant can
exercise his rights under the contract, the plaintiff must be put in
status quo.
We can see no merit In this contention.
By the express terms of the contract, the plaintiff forfeited all his rights by
default in the making of payments.
By such default he renounced
the contract, under these circumstances, sell the property at any
time after the default, without being liable to the plaintiff for the
purchase money paid by him? Must he forever continue to hold the
property to await the offer of payment, to be made at the convenience of the plaintiff, giving the latter an opportunity to complete
the purchase, if the property advanced In price, or refuse, if the
property diminished in value, and in the meantime subjecting the
defendant to any and all risks of loss? The law imposes no such
unreasonable requirement on a party, who has in good faith kept
and offered to perform the stipulations of his contract.
The defaulting party has forfeited all his rights under the contract by his
default, and is not in a position to make any demands of the defendant.
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In the late case of Sanders v. Brock, 230 Pa. 609, the court laid
down this well settled doctrine: "Where the party who has advanced part of the purchase money, or done an act in part performance
of the agreement, and then stops short and refuses to proceed to
its ultimate conclusion, the other party being willing and ready to
proceed, and fulfill all his stipulations according to the contract, the
party defaulting will not be permitted to recover what has thus been
advanced or done."
We think that the case at bar is governed by the decision In
Shilanski v. Farrel, 57 Superior 137. The facts of that case are
on all fours with those of the case at bar. The court there held:
"Where time for the payment of installments of the purchase
money is of the essence of the contract for the sale of real estate,
the acceptance of installments at irregular times may operate as a
waiver of a right to enforce a forfeiture or prior failures to pay
on the day stated, yet the mere act of receiving a payment or several payments after the dates when the purchaser was bound to
make them, does not, without more, operate as a complete abrogation of a right explicitly given to rescind the contract, if Installments subsequently due are not paid on the days stated, and that
in such a case where the vendor had upon a forfeiture and failure
of the vendee to make a payment when due, conveyed the property
to another vendee, the vendee defaulting could not recover the installments he had paid."
Judgment will therefore be entered for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Failure to pay punctually the instalments of purchase money,
was, by the contract, to result in the forfeiture of the vendee's
rights under the contract. The learned court below has, we think
properly, concluded that toleration of want of punctuality in paying some instalments, is not to be regarded as a cancellation of the
stipulation for punctuality as respects future instalments. After
the 10 payments, none of which was promptly made, there was a
failure for two months to make a tender. The length of the previous delays is not shown. How can we infer from the forbearance
of the vendor, that he intends the vendee to understand that he
will not require punctuality in the future? How would a toleration
of delays for one, two, three days, be a notice that delays for three
months will be permitted?
We find nothing in the patience of the vendor to make the
continuance of it compulsory, especially the continuance for an
unprecedentedly long time.
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Then the question is, payments having been made amounting
to $200, and two defaults occurring, which, by the terms of the contract "shall result in the forfeiture of the rights" of the vendee,
and which induce the vendor to find another purchaser, may the
vendee recover back the $200 or any part thereof? The vendee has
lost the right to complete the purchase. He never had a right to
get back any payments made by him, if
the vendor violated no
right of his. The court below has properly decided in favor of the
vendor and against the vendee.
Cases answering some of the
queries raised by the case before us are Shilanski v. Farrell, 57
Superior 137, and Sgarlat v. Deggory, 68 Super. 53.
The judgment of the learned court below is
AFFIRMED.

STRIF v. THE R. R. CO.
Evidence--Expert

Testimony-Hypothetical

Question-Admissibility

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Strief owned a farm on the south side of a river, the Schuylkill. The R. R. Company occupied the north side with its track.
A witness testified that the Company for the purpose of laying additional tracks, extended an embankment into the river for the distance of 35 feet.
Subsequently to this extension, in times of high
water, the river covered large parts of the plaintiff's farm, making
them unusable.
To prove that the extension was the cause of the
flooding, a hydraulic engineer, who had studied the site, and heard
the witness describe the extension of the embankment, expressed
the opinion that the embankment caused
the
flooding, assuming the truth of the prior witness' testimony.
A verdict for
nlaintiff. Appeal
Quinn, for the Plaintiff:
Reed, for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
PUGLIESE, J. The sole question
for our determination
in
this case is, can an expert witness be allowed to predicate his opinion
upon the testimony of a prior witness whose testimony is not contradictory, assuming the truth of the testimony.
It the'same set of facts upon which the expert was to give an
opinion were all repeated to him in the form of a hypothetical question, there would have been no doubt as to its competency. Hypot.hetical questions differ from the question put in the case at bar
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only in the manner by which the facts are made known to the expert. The source of information is the same in both cases, i.e., the
testimony of the witness;, but in the former case the facts are presented to the expert by mere repetition on the part of counsel of
what his witness has said, while in the case at bar the expert obtains the facts, upon which he premises his opinion, from the witness himself. An expert can, undoubtedly, form as correct a Judgment upon evidence he has heard, assuming it to be true, as if the
same evidence were submitted to him in the form of a hyprotheticad question.
In Yardley v. Cuthbertson, 108 Pa. 395, it was held that questions asking the witness to express an opinion upon a defined portion of the testimony given on the trial of the case, "that testimony
exnot being contradictory in itself, and its truthfulness being
.pressly assumed, the witness being first made acquainted with the
whole of it upon which he was to pronounce," were competent questions which might be lawfully put and answered. In Updegrove v.
Phila, & Reading R. R. Co., 249 Pa. 69, the facts of which are similar
to those in the case at bar, the doctrine of Yardley v. Cuthbertson,
supra, was applied and it was there held that it was not error to
permit an expert to predicate his opinion upon the uncontradicted
testimony of a prior witness, assuming the truth of that testimony.
For the foregoing reasonis and upon the authorities quoted we
must affirm the ruling of the trial court in this case and dismiss
the appeal.

OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The expert is requested to state, not facts, but the causal relaIt does not
tion, if any, between facts stated by another witness.
appear that the testimony of this witness contained any inconsistWe may assume that it was coherent. The expert heard
ancies.
'Whether it was true or not, was for the decision,
this testimony.
But he was asked whether, the denot of him, but of the jury.
scriptions of this witness being assumed to be true, the embankThe learned court below has properly
ment caused the flooding.
Had a quesheld that the question put to the expert was correct.
tion asked the witness to assume facts, a, b, c, d, e, and then to express a judgment as to causation, .the procedure would have been
But, there being but one witness, and no incoherunobjectionable.
ences in his testimony, the question, assuming the truth of what
witness X has said, what in your opinion was the cause of the floodIt was eviing, is substantially hypothetical in the same sense.
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dertly proper to permit it, and the judgment of the learned court
below is AFFIRMED.

A. B. and C. v IANUFACTURING CO.
Negligence-Right of Adult Children to Recover for Loss of a Parent-Evidence-Damages
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs are adult children of X, who employed by defendant, was mortally wounded by the defendant's negligence.
The
court held: (1) Plaintiff's properly united in the action. (2) The damages could not embrace solatium for the grief and sense of loss arising from X's death, (3) nor be the amount of money that X could
have earned during what would have been his lifetime, but for the
-accident, but only for such part of it as would have come to them
by gifts from X, nor (4) for these amounts, but only for the present
worth of them, and that if the interest in any estate with which X
left during the period of which the accident had shortenee his life,
would have equalled any gifts he would have made to them during
that period they could recover nothing.
Hutchison, for the Plaintiff.
Lewis, for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
CARTER, J.
The first three rulings of the court and the first
part of the fourth, are admitted by both sides. This makes it useless for us to discuss whether or not they were proper. We have
only to consider the last part of the fourth ruling of the court,
namely: "and that if the interest in any estate which X left, during
the period of which thi accident had shortened his life, would have
equalled any gifts he would have made to them during tha't period
This ruling of the court below, we
they could recover nothing."
think is error.
In the case of Stahler v. Railway Company, 199 Pa. 383, it was
held: "Adult sons may recover damages for the death of their
father caused by the negligent act of another, although by reason
of their father's death they have inherited a large estate."
The
fact of the inheritance and its amount are not admissable in evidence upon the question of damages.
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the case of Ridgeway v.
This doctrine has been followed in
Sayre Electric Company, 258 Pa. 400, in which the Supreme Court
said: "The cause of action which was the subject matter of the release was the claim on the insurance, and in an action for personal injuries, it has been held uniformly that the defendant cannot show, either as a bar to the action or in reduction of damages,
that the injured person received, or is entitled to receive compensation for his injuries in the form of insurance or otherwise."
In 13 Cyc. 364, it states that: "The rule seems to be well recognized that it cannot be shown in mitigation of damages
plaintiff or beneficiary acquired property by descent from
or received a sum of money for insurance upon his life."
We therefore, think
Coulter v. Pine Twp., 164 Pa. 543.
trial judge erred in such ruling.

that the
deceased,
See also
that the

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Further discussion of the questions involved is unnecessary.
The judgment of the learned court below is AFFIRMED.

COATMONWEALTH v. HAMMOND
Criminal Law-Evidence-Former Trial--Testimony Taken Through
An Interpretex'-Hearsay Evidence
STATEMENT

OF FACTS

On a first trial for larceny, Hammond, a Syrian, who cannot
speak English, testified, alleging that at the time of the theft he
This testimony was translated by the
was at a certain place.
At a second trial Hammond testified that he
court's Interpreter.
was at a different place. A witness who heard the interpreter's version of the former testimony, is allowed to testify to it, as evidence
Conof inconsistency between the two testimonies of Hammond.
viction, motion for a new trial.
Capozi, for the Plaintiff.
Crowley, for the Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT
The question iswhether the admission of the
MISS BURR, J.
witness' testimony as evidence of the inconsistency between the two
In
testimonies of Hammond was a violation of ,the hearsay rule.
comm. v. Brown, 66 Super. 519, the facts of which are similar to
those now before the Court, the interpreter admitted he had inter-
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preted correctly.
The witness was allowed to testify as to what he
heard the interpreter say at the former trial.
There is abundant authority for the admissibility of testimony to
show inconsistency.
By the Act of May 23, 1887, P. L. 158, Sec.
2, former proceedings may be orally proved for the purpose of contradicting testimony of witness previously given. But this Is so only when witness has testified on both occasions.
Com. v. Nanes,
15 D. L. R. 149.
Evidence which goes to contradict testimony of
the other side may be admissible though otherwise objectionable as
hearsay, 6 P. & L. 9718 citing the early case of Lightner v. Kike,
4 S. & R. 202; and evidence of what witnesses swore to In former
trial is admissible to contradict him, 6 P. & L. 9780 citing Henderson v. Jones, 10 S. & R.; Cowden v. Reynolds, 12 S. & R. 281. Authority for the same proposition may also be found in 40 Cyc. 2703,
and Field v. Shuster, 26 Super. 82.
The rule is well settled that witness' credibility may be impeached by showing inconsistent statements including those made In
pleading the causes. Henry's Pa. Trial Evidence, Sect. 65; Wigmore on Evidence, Sect. 1066; Scott's Administrators v. Amer. Express Company, 257 Pa. 25.
Though such testimony Is not considered as conclusively establishing the fact, it is a declaration or admission of the witness that it is so, and for this reason is always admissible even between the different parties.
Hess v. Vinton ColIlery Co,., 255 Pa. 78.
Since a defendant in a criminal prosecution who testifies in his
own behalf may be impeached by showing his inconsistent or contradictory statements, 40 Cyc. 2708; 225 Pa. 113, the law applying to
witnesses as in the cases supra, is true of such defendant who by
taking the stand becomes himself a witness.
It was further objected that the translation of Hammond's testimony may have been at fault. The Act of February 18, 1869, authorizes the Governor to appoint interpreters for the Philadelphia
and Allegheny courts.
Since the Act it has become the custom for
various couits to have such an interpreter, whose need was recognized in Com. v. Hess, 18 Pa. C. C. 542.
The translations of
Hammond's testimony were made by the court interpreter, that is
one sworn in court as such.
Sworn translations of an Interpreter
are not hearsay. 'Wharton Sec. 174; Greenleaf, page 274.
Interpretations are prima facie correct.
'Whether they are or not may be
shown by either party, or a third person who hears the testimony.
Its weight and not Its competency is affected thereby.
Com. v.
Vose, 157 Mass. 393, (32 N. E. 355); Greenleaf Sect. 183; Fabrlgas v.
Mastyn, 20 State Trials 171; 8 D. L. R. 94.
Whether testimony
given in a foreign language was correctly interpreted is a quesalon
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of fact in Pennsylvania with which an appellate court will not interCom. v. Corsina, 261 Pa.
fere except in case of manifest error.
Furthermore competent oral admissions may be proved other693.
wise than by the evidence of the interpreter, because the interpreter
for the purpose becomes the joint agent of the parties; what each
says is regarded as his own statement. 22 C. J. Sect. 335; 8 D. L.
Forum 74; 17 L. R. A. 813.
In Com. v. Pava, 268 Pa. 521, it was charged that the court erred in permitting the witness to testify to admissions made in his
presence by the defendant through an Interpreter, because the witness was not familiar with the defendant's language, and depended
But the court held that the testimony
solely on the interpreter.
was mere repetition of that of the interpreter himself and was thereThe original
fore receivable and an exception to the hearsay rule.
party, the witness, and the interpreter, are under oath and subject
The testimony of the third person who heard
to cross-examination.
the interpretation is not obnoxious to the hearsay rule, 10 R. C. L.
135.
Wherefore the court is of the opinion that whether the interpretation is admittedly correct as in 66 Super. 519, is immaterial
when made by the court interpreter. Motion for new trial Is refused.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
We see no cause for changing the decision reached by the learned court below.
That a witness in one trial, may be impeached by showing that,
at a former trial of the same issue, he testified in a different and inconsistent way, is not to be doubted. One or the other of the statements must be erroneous, and the jury is destitute of means to decide which is right, if either.
A party, in a civil or a criminal case, may become a witness,
and, when he does, he is liable to the same species of impeachment,
It was entirely proper,
to which any other witness would be liable.
then, to show discrepency between the two statements of the defendant.
Apparently, the testimony in the former trial, was turned into
Whether his testimony at the
English by the court interpreter.
later trial, was in English, or, being in Syrian, was translated by
the same or another interpreter, is not clear. Of course, when A
bears what an interpreter says what the witness says, he is not as
close to the witness, as if he understood the speech of the witness,
Nevertheless courts must rely on inand did his own translating.
terpreters, and there is no reason for olbjecting to evidence of what
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the interpreter has said the defendant said, for the purpose of comparing it with what the -defendant is now saying. There is possibility that the interpreter has made an erroneous translation, but
there is no way of avoiding this possibility.
There is no force In the suggestion that the notes of the court
stenographer should have been employed, to prove what the former
testimony was. It Is not evident that a court stenographer was emEven if he was, the memory of a witness who heard Is reployed.
Cf. CommonIt may be as reliable as the official notes.
ceivable.
wealth v. Brown, 66 Super. 519.
The judgment of the learned court below is AFFIRMED.

DODGE v. BOCHE
Witness-Competency-Depositions Taken byObjecting Side-Subsequent Competency of Deposing Party For All Purposes
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A rule of court required all depositions to be filed before the
trial. Under a rule, Dodge took the deposition of Boche and filed it
B'oche, who otherwise
but at the time of the trial did not use it.
would have been incompetent to testify for himself, offered his own
MoVerdict for the plaintiff.
deposition. The court rejected it.
tion for new trial.
Rubenstein, for Plaintiff.
Scott, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
The lower court erred in rejecting the deposition
Schwartz, J.
The deposition was taken
of Boche. It should have been adfnltted.
in full compliance with the rules of the court. It was filed before
the trial, and accordingly became proper evidence for the use of
either party. The cases of Lour v. Vandermark, 4 Kulp (Pa.) 423.
The
and Appeal of Mary E. Lapp, 6 Pa. Sup. 143, hold this.
depositions
is
"Where
those cases
emphasized in
principal
regularly taken are flIed by order of the court, they thereupon become proper evidence for either party."
The court recognizes the provision of the Act of May 23, 1887,
to wit: "In any civil proceeding the testimony of any competent
witness may be taken by commission or deposition in accordance
with the laws of the Commonwealth and the rules of the proper
court." It believes, however, that the act of Dodge, the plaintiff, in
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taking and filing the deposition of his adversary, Boche, constituted
a waiver of any incompetencies that Boche might have in testifying. This placed Boche in a position to offer the said deposition as
Shadle's Estate, 30 Pa. Sup. 15; 40
evidence in his own behalf.
Cyc. 2239.
Though a careful, exhaustive study and search of the Pennsylvania decisions has been made, none were found bearing on this
particular point. However, in the case of Rice v. Waddell, 69 S.
& W. 605, it was held that: "A party waives the incompetency of
his adversary by taking the latter's deposition, although he does
not use it at the trial."
In the court's judgment, this is a satisfactory and plausible
view of the matter. It would be decidedly unfair and prejudicial to
allow a party to take the deposition of his adversary, and then
have him refuse to accept the same, because he finds it unfavorable
to him. His act of taking the deposition impliedly asserts it to be
worthy of belief and consideration.
The fact that the defendant was in the court is no ground for
A deposition once taken by the adverse
rejection of the deposition.
party and filed as was the deposition in issue, becomes independent
evidence in the case, notwithstanding the presence of the party in
court. This principle was expressed in Clark v. Rice, 106 N. W.
231, authorizing the taking of depositions of opposing party.
Holding that depositions taken before the trial may be read,
though the deposing parties are present at the trial. For the reasons herein given, the lower court erred in rejecting the deposition
of Boche, and a new trial is granted to the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The plaintiff took the deposition of the defendant and filed it,
as the rule of court required. At the trial plaintiff made no use of
But, it was unable by the defendant, its worthithe deposition.
ness of at least being heard by the jury, being affirmed by the plaintiff's act. He could not say, as he virtually did, the testimony of
the defendant is worthy of being heard, and then, refusing himself
to offer It to the jury, object to its being offered by the defendant.
Cf. Bennett v. Williams, 57 Pa. 404; Says the court in Lowry's Appeal, 6 Superior 143: "The depositions seem to have been regularly
taken under a rule, and were filed by order of the court. ThereupCf. Lentz's Eson they became proper evidence for either party."
184; Wigmore's
tate, 261 Pa. 530; Ansonia v. Cooper, 60 Conn.
Cases, p. 561.
The able opinion of the- learned court below is affirmed and the
judgment AFFIRMED.

